

第十二周 内亚扩张影响下的整合 (2021.5.27)

*Local Integration and Eurasian Analogies: Structuring Southeast Asian History, c. 1350- c. 1830* was published in the *Journal of Modern Asian Studies* in 1993, 9 years after the publication of *Burmese Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580-1760* (1984), and ten and sixteen years prior to the publications of *Strange Parallels Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830. Volume 1: Integration on the Mainland* (2003) and *Strange Parallels: Southeast Asia in Global Context, c. 800-1830. Volume 2: Mainland Mirrors: Europe, Japan, China, South Asia, and the Islands* (2009). There are traces of Lieberman's later critique of Anthony Reid's work when he writes how 'in general, political, cultural and domestic economic changes are too often conceived as epiphenomenal reflections of oceanic innovation.' Lieberman further opens up space for new forms of archival and historiographic work within indigenous source materials when he writes of how 'the heavy emphasis on maritime influences to explain local change tends to be reductionist and exaggerated, at least for the mainland; and reflects above all the privileged position of European mercantile records, as opposed to less accessible indigenous sources more concerned with rural and court life.'

It was interesting how he also critically opened up the category of Southeast Asia. Lieberman writes of how 'pioneering efforts to overcome Southeast Asia's historiographic fragmentation may have overcompensated by postulating an artificial coherence between the island world and the mainland.' I was interested in how he described the income differential between coastal revenues and rural interior revenues over time, 'direct trade revenues magnified the income differential between central authorities in control of the ports and interior elites dependent on agricultural taxes... the proceeds were used to centralise political patronage, to magnify the religious and architectural glory of the capital, and to finance military campaigns.' Lieberman further describes how 'Vietnam's peculiar geography rendered maritime influences more politically ambiguous than in Thailand or Burma. On the one hand, the extraordinary elongated coastline and the lack of a unifying river meant that maritime inputs more easily encouraged centrifugalism. Lieberman also discusses solar fluctuations and some striking early modern correlations between temperature/rainfall fluctuations in northwestern Europe, on the one hand, and in Burma, Thailand and Java, on the other. The sense of Eurasian synchronization linking solar activity and state formation reminded me of the work of Alexander Chizhevsky, the Polish Soviet biophysicist who proposed in his 1924 book *Physical Factors of the Historical Process* that human history is influenced by the eleven-year peaks in sunspot activity, triggering humans en masse to act upon existing grievances and complaints through revolts, revolutions, civil wars and wars between nations. In 1942 Chizhevsky was asked by Stalin to retract his writings on solar cycles because they contradicted Soviet theories of the reasons for the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. Chizhevsky refused, was arrested and spent eight years in a gulag in the Ural Mountains.

Lieberman goes on to describe how population and output were concentrated in politically dominant lowland areas: in the Irrawaddy Basin, central Thailand, the Vietnamese coastal lowlands and the Mekong delta. Lieberman writes of how 'enhanced mobility of land and labor, and greater elite dependence on commercial income, in turn, may have helped psychologically and politically to erode hereditary concentrations of rural authority that were particularly resistant to central demands. I thought his comparison of the peninsulas of mainland Southeast Asia and Europe between 1450 and 1800 was interesting. Lieberman captures the gradual changing of power along coastlines as a simultaneous dynamism of material and psychological shifts. He also describes the rhythm of change, that far from being incremental the centralisation of authority had a convulsive quality, with periods of military challenge and/or disintegration followed by intensified, more successful projects of concentration. Lieberman questions the Asiatic Mode of Production in Marxist historical analysis which perceived the state's domination of the economy in Asia as an inhibitor, dooming Southeast Asia to institutional stasis and sterile dynastic cyclicity. This is a precursor to Lieberman's discussion of the 'law of

Southeast Asian inertia' in *Strange Parallels*. Lieberman questions whether the Mughal empire differed from developments in mainland Southeast Asia because the empire lacked a central artery comparable to the Irrawaddy or Chaophraya. He then writes how 'whereas Qing-era settlement on the northern frontier had only the most marginal economic significance for the empire as a whole and left the political structure of China's heartland basically untouched, Vietnam's expansion between 1470 and 1835 all the way to the lower Mekong radically transformed that country's political dynamics, not to mention its economy, demography, and ethnic extension. I was curious as to whether this argument that the frontier had a non-transformative effect on the Qing courts relative to other frontier expansions in Southeast Asia has been challenged by different linguistic and source material.

Returning to the argument of an artificial coherence in historiography of the early modern era (1350-1830) between archipelagic Southeast Asia and mainland Southeast Asia, Lieberman writes how because the archipelago did not hold agricultural resources comparable to those of Burma or Vietnam, maritime commerce consistently exerted a greater influence on local evolution. Furthermore, because maritime trade more easily defied state boundaries than did overland or riverine exchange. in the Muslim (though not the Spanish) sphere, proselytism and ethnic integration were less closely tied to projects of state aggrandisement than on the mainland. This reminded me of of Wolters' imagery of refracting, localising ideas, texts, materials. Lieberman writes of Muslims from Persia, Gujarat, Bengal, Coromandel, South China moving through an international network, trading spices and island goods between the Indian Ocean and China, through the Melaka and Sunda Straits. Lieberman argues that the European role differed in the archipelago from the mainland prior to 1825 because the mainland produced no significant spices to attract initial European attention, and the Dutch showed comparatively modest commercial interest. Populations and land armies on the mainland were also perceived as a more formidable barrier than in the islands.

I thought it was interesting how Lieberman describes the emergence through the fifteenth to seventeenth centuries of a distinctive Malayo-Muslim coastal commercial culture along a three thousand mile arc reaching from Western Sumatra to the Spice islands and the southern Philippines; of how once peripheral cultural zones with weak traditions of Indianized statecraft (Makassar, Ternate, Maluku, Aceh) imaginatively constructed a synthesis between the boom in trade and Islamic ideology, and how Islamic conversion led to abrupt innovations in diet, burial, dress, music, oral culture, script and literature. Lieberman's description locates Islamic socialism of the early 20th Century into a much longer genealogy. I thought it was interesting how Lieberman locates Dutch colonialism in a dialectical sense of historical evolution, unintended consequences, a sense of the idea of ab-sequences (not travelling con with but away from), magnetism in history, guns, cannons held a magnetic, almost magical quality, rivers are magnetic. I found the way he describes the dialectics of coastal and interior revenues, evolving power differentials and their collapse, nuclearity, chance, magnetism and centrifugality powerful frames for exploring history and geography, laterality and depth, in a single movement.

Lieberman writes of how centrifugal rather than integrative tendencies would predominate in archipelagic Southeast Asia after 1670, connecting these tendencies to the geography of the archipelago...supply ports were widely separated by treacherous seas; even the Straits of Melaka could not provide an avenue of communication and control comparable to the Irrawaddy or Chaophraya. In Malaya, tin and other resources were so dispersed that in contrast to most of the mainland, the growth of international demand in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries actually encouraged political devolution. I was interested in how distances can be recorded in historiographic work. Lieberman writes of the volcanic soils of Central and Eastern Java which were able to contain a population comparable to the Burmese or Thai lowlands... however with no unifying riverine artery or easy island wide communication, and with mountains and swamps, the tendency toward centrifugality reigned. I was curious how southwestern China would fit into Lieberman's descrip-

tion of centrifugality as a terrain-conditioned tendency. Lieberman writes of tensions between the mercantile coast and the agrarian interior that led to more severe outbreaks of violence than in Burma or Thailand. In the seventeenth century, the destruction of Java's north coast ports actually owed more to Mataram's attacks than to Dutch interference. I was reminded of J.C. Van Leur's autonomous sequences. Lieberman seems to take the sense of autonomy one further in describing the autonomous sequences of the earth and volcanic soil, magnetic rivers and rainfall, sunlight, coastal nourishment. If J.C. Van Leur had lived beyond 1942 and 34 years of age it would be interesting to compare his later work with Lieberman's descriptions. Lieberman describes how bitter struggles had provided openings for Dutch or other foreign intervention, locating the interface of autonomous sequences with colonial sequences. This also gives a sense to the form of Lieberman's ab-sequences. I thought it was interesting reading Lieberman's descriptions of tensions in Java against a different set of scholarship on the New Order government's moves in the 1960s to unify the Indonesian archipelago through satellites and space-age engineering.

I was also interested in Lieberman's argument that though, Vietnam's geography was not much more favorable than Java's in the seventeenth century and the wars in Vietnam at this time bore comparison in scope and intensity to those in Java, 'the Vietnamese, through their unique access to China and their fear of Chinese invasion, developed strengths - namely a proto-nationalist popular culture, a standardized elite education, and a repertoire of literate, bureaucratic skills - that over the long term compensated for geographic division more successfully than Javanese political culture.' Lieberman's work opened up a comparative dimension for me between Vietnam and Indonesia in the Cold War in 1950s and 60s. I was curious in particular as to whether Vietnamese war planners in the United States were aware of the diverse origins, timelines and political cultures, proto-nationalist histories and psychological difference or if there was an 'artificial coherence' in theorising the way in which Southeast Asian leaders behaved, and mainland Southeast Asian leader, Suharto v Ho Chi Minh.

Lieberman also examines Spanish proselytising zeal in the Philippines that reached resistance in the southern Philippine islands of Mindanao. I was interested in the continuity of the resistance today. Lieberman describes the fusion of political and religious legitimacy: 'in its uneven transmission from center to periphery and from elite to mass, the Spanish cultural project resembled the creation of Islamic states in the Outer Islands or more especially of Theravada and Neo-Confucian empires on the mainland. War-making in the Dutch East India Company was furthermore mirrored by wars in the Philippines, the Hispano-Dutch War of 1609 - 1648, the Moro Wars of the 1750s, and the British occupation of Manila from 1762 to 1764, driving ambitious and continuous reforms in finances and military organisation. I was also curious of Phelan's work on how in the Philippine context early Spanish strengths - a truculent evangelical imperial mission, a monopoly on literate texts, well-articulated ecclesiastical and secular hierarchies, relatively disciplined military forces, the indispensable financial subsidies and colonizing experience of Mexico...bringing the North American continent into the frame...

how after 1750, the erosion of Spanish and Dutch economic and naval power vis-a-vis Britain weakened Batavia and Manila both internationally and in terms of domestic control. Lieberman writes of the 'unprecedented speed', brought on by the technological changes of the early and mid-nineteenth century stating: 'It is precisely this acceleration that recommends the nineteenth century as a terminus for the present study. The benchmarks of European penetration included the aforementioned Java War of 1825-1830; the founding in 1819 of Singapore to serve as pivot of British power in the western archipelago; the treaty of 1824 dividing Malaya and Sumatra into British and Dutch spheres; the accelerated settlement of the Philippines frontier starting in the 1820s, which presaged the irruption of foreign military power into continental Southeast Asia and which permanently transformed the context of mainland development.' I thought it

was interesting here that Lieberman recognises a convergence or injection of the island world into the mainland in the 19th Century.

Lieberman concludes writing of how political, cultural and commercial integration in mainland Southeast Asia found recognisable, if muted, echoes in early modern Japan, Russia and Western Europe. To what extent Eurasian convergences derived from common epidemiological, climatic, or institutional rhythms, from the effects of firearms, or from the transmission via international trade of what was originally a purely regional prosperity is by no means clear; but a careful exploration promises to modify the received emphasis on European exceptionalism, to show that according to some parameters Europe was a peculiar variant on a more widespread early modern pattern. Especially curious are parallels between the chronologies and multi-state dynamics of Europe and of mainland Southeast Asia, at the far ends of the Eurasian landmass. I was curious in how Lieberman approaches European exceptionalism in a different vein to sub-altern scholarship, the work of Chakrabarty in *Provincialising Europe* or Edward Said. Lieberman seems to open up a more ionospheric sense of the embers of history, physics operates strangely, spooky action occurs at a distance, mirrors unfold. was curious in this capacity if radical changes in our understanding of the physical world (Einstein's 1905 Special Theory of Relativity and 1915 General Theory of Relativity, strange parallels with or thereabouts the Russian revolutions) also changed perceptions of history, the emergence of a quantum world and spooky action at a distance, the aether and radio waves altered the perception of how regions are inter-connected or might affect one another. An integrative history that doesn't require physical co-location, or visible lines of transmission enters its own strange tide and historiographic acrobatics.

Lieberman at the same time traces geographic conditions, the 'archipelago's peculiar post-1670 development vis-a-vis the mainland was heavily determined by geography, which denied it extensive agricultural reserves or unifying internal arteries which made it the world's spicery and which left it exposed to the early application of European seapower.' Lieberman concludes stating that 'none of these considerations necessarily invalidate Southeast Asia as a unit of study, whose integrity one can justify in terms of underlying cultural commonalities, classical and colonial parallels, current interactions, or simply geographic convenience. But they do warn us lest, in our desire to compensate for an overly particularistic early modern historiography, we impose an artificial regional unity. Lieberman made me think here of a secondary Wallace line but in a reversal. Lieberman's descriptions of the interconnected threads between coasts and interiors, neighbours and foes traces how different historical trajectories carve open, or leave in their wake opportunities for the autonomous sequences or revolutionary tremors of different groups. I was also curious to read more on India and China in Lieberman's analysis of state formation in the early modern era (1350-1830) of Southeast Asia and whether there are obscured transmission lines and synchronies in the record.

