

第八周 社会变迁研究 (2021.4.29)

On page xiv of *Social Change in Modern India*, M.N. Srinivas - from the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioural Sciences, Stanford - writes, 'I must express my apologies to the Committee for the Rabindranath Tagore Memorial Lectureship for making them wait for over two years for the manuscript of my lectures.' Pages previous, M.B Emeneau (who would co-publish the *Dravidian Etymological Dictionary* in 1961 and introduce the study of areal phenomena in Dravidian linguistics giving detailed descriptions of Toda, Badaga, Kolami and Kota) describes how Mysore Narasimhachar Srinivas delivered the lecture two years prior where he is at the University of California, Berkeley, in May 1963. M.N Srinivas, Emeneau writes,

'first introduced the notion of Sanskritization as an underlying process of Indian social change, in his book *Religion and Society Among the Coorgs*. In these lectures, he has developed the idea both in itself and in its contrapuntal relations with that much more conspicuous process of change, *Westernization*. Both by training, as an Oxford social anthropologist, and by background, as a South Indian Brahmin, he is eminently fitted to give a sophisticated, yet intimate, expression to his themes, in a way that Tagore might well have appreciated highly. Not the least important part of the book, and an integral part of it by peculiarly intimate inner lines of connection, is Professor Srinivas' apologia for the anthropologist's role in the midst of the rapid change and "modern" development in his own society.

On May 11, 1963, Canada's new Prime Minister, Lester B. Pearson, agreed to allow American nuclear weapons to be placed in Canada, following a two-day meeting with U.S. President John F. Kennedy. A week later, on May 18, Sukarno was named as President for Life of Indonesia. At Berkeley, Ali Wardhana and the Indonesian economists who would later serve as Suharto's economic policy-makers were busy completing various doctoral degrees in the years leading up to 1963, Wardhana on the topic of "Monetary policy in an underdeveloped economy: with special reference to Indonesia"; Nitisastro in the Department of Economics and Demography. I was curious if they ever crossed paths with M.B Emeneau in the Department of Linguistics, or were present at M.N Srinivas's lecture in May 1963. In a way, the question illuminates how area studies at Berkeley at the height of the Cold War formed a centre of gravity to the processes of Westernization and secularization M.N Srinivas describes psychologically conditioning a new elite, opening up an interesting case study in the parallel biographies of South Asian and Southeast Asian elites moving through North American faculties in the 1960s. Marshall McLuhan and the emergent network imaginary etching its way into Lieberman's strange parallels.¹

M.N Srinivas divides the contents of his book into five sections: 1. *Sanskritization*; 2. *Westernization*; 3. *Some expressions of Caste Mobility*; 4. *Secularization*; and 5. *Some Thoughts on the Study of One's Own Society* and I was inter-

¹ M.N Srinivas writes of how a century earlier, a Westernized intelligentsia had emerged among Indians by the 'sixties of the nineteenth century, and leaders of this class became the torchbearers of a new and modern India. The leaders included such great names as the Tagores, Vivekananda, Ranade, Gokhale, Tilak, Patel, Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Radhakrishnan.

ested throughout in how he imagines each process interlinking. In the *Notes* on page 165, M.N Srinivas, deeply embedded in ongoing debates, writes of how ‘Marc Galanter has recently stated that “the British period may be seen as one in which the legal system rationalized the intricacies of local customary caste relationships in terms of classical Hindu legal concepts like varna and pollution. To borrow and slightly distort Srinivas’ terms, we can think of the British period as a period of ‘Sanskritization’ in legal notions of caste. In independent India, as varna and pollution gave way to the notion of groups characterized by economic, educational, political, and religious characteristics, we may think of this not as the abolition of caste, but as the ‘Westernization’ of notions of caste.”’ There is a sense that M.N. Srinivas does not wholly follow Galanter’s logic. I was trying to imagine Srinivas’s description of Sanskritization, Westernization and secularization alongside Deleuze’s immanence and an anti-dialectical philosophy where one does not replace the other but merge into something new like three electrical fields interlacing each other, a Trisolaris, three body problem imaginary applied to the gravity well of each process. M.N Srinivas complicates the description of Galanter’s monodirectional view of history as a process of westernisation/rationalisation, writing of how magico-religious beliefs and technology co-inhabit the same sphere:

in the summer of 1952 in my field village of Rampura in Mysore, I came across the driver of a government bulldozer who was leveling a few acres of land in one of the fields of the headman. The driver was a Tamil-speaker from Bangalore, the biggest city in the state, and his recreation in the village was giving demonstrations of traditional black magic....the manipulation of Western technology does not mean that the manipulators have accepted a rationalistic and scientific world view. Far from it. The bulldozer driver in Rampura had mastered the mechanical motions necessary to drive it, and could even do minor repairs; but he was not only traditional in his religious beliefs, he had even picked up some black magic, a knowledge usually confined to small groups. He did not perceive any incompatibility between driving a bulldozer and practicing black magic. The two sectors were kept completely ‘discrete.’ The veneration of tools and machines at the Dasara festival, however, is more than ‘discreteness’; it represents a carry-over of traditional magico-religious beliefs in the new world of modern technology (p. 55). Also a little later M.N Srinivas writes of how a great past can be either an energiser or an opiate. In the main, however, it acted as an energiser, and has provided modern India with a mystique for national identity as well as development. Simultaneously with the stimulation of national consciousness came regionalism, “communalism”, and casteism (p. 79)

I was reminded of Kevin Fogg’s exploration of mysticism in the Islamic socialism movements of the early 20th Century in Indonesia. In *Rebellion Under the Banner of Islam* (1981), C.K Van Dijk explores how Kartosuwirjo’s time in Malangbong in rural Java moulded his beliefs around a mystical Sufism at odds with the style of Islamic modernism of the Surabaya circle of *Sarekat Islam* leaders: “many local ulama and villagers attributed his [Kartosuwirjo’s] ability to recruit followers among the poor and unsophisticated peasants to his mystical powers...the D[arul] I[s]lam’s central leadership welcomed and even manipulated rumours about his magical powers by shielding Kartosuwirjo from, and making him almost inaccessible to, his guerrilla fighters in the field.” (Horikoshi 1975: 74-75). I found a [current project](#)

by Stephen Smith at All Souls College, Oxford, on similar lines exploring the supernatural politics of Maoist China as the ways in which ordinary people used the religious, magical and folkloric resources of traditional culture to make sense of and respond to state-initiated modernization, which was deeply coercive and utopian at the same time; how popular religion, magic and folklore also had an eminently practical value, offering what Charles Stewart called a 'cognitive cartography', a system of beliefs and practices that enabled people to map and negotiate the 'traumas and ambiguities of life'. Smith describes Dipesh Chakrabarty's position, 'that when seeking to understand subaltern politics outside the West, scholars need to resist the 'logic of secular-rational calculations inherent in the modern conception of the political', and instead stretch that conception to include 'the agency of gods, spirits, and other supernatural beings'.

M.N Srinivas writes of the limitations of micro-studies in a country like India, which has great regional diversity and whose people are divided into hundreds of castes. Similarly, macro-studies are apt to miss the nuances, refinements, and subtleties which can be reached only by detailed micro-studies. 'At the risk of giving expression to a truism', he writes, 'I would say that the Indian sociologist has to be temperamentally and methodologically ambidextrous, resorting to either type of study as the occasion demands. Micro-studies provide insights while macro-studies yield perspectives, and movement from one to the other is essential.' Following from his focus on scale, I was also however curious in what way the sociologist must flit between the logic of secular rational calculations and a mystical-agentic calculation of psychological, magico-religious depth and how Sanskritization moved contrapuntally or in a tripolar electrical field with Westernization and secularization as forces of change.

[Cindy Nguyen](#) a historian at Brown University writes of how 'M.N. Srinivas demonstrates how sanskritization and westernization formed a process by which secular forms of rank (exhibited by capital, political position, and education) and ritual rank (caste, ritual, performance, relational power) came to terms with one another. "When a caste or section of a caste achieved secular power it usually also tried to acquire the traditional symbols of high status, namely the customs, ritual, ideas, beliefs, and life style of the locally highest castes. It also meant obtaining the services of a Brahmin priest at various rites de passage, performing Sanskritic calendrical festivals, visiting famous pilgrimage centers, and finally, attempting to obtain a better knowledge of the sacred literature." I was curious where Srinivas emphasises how mobility afforded through sanskritization was one of 'positional' change rather than total 'structural' change, tracing as Nguyen posits, 'the importance of relational power and dominance and the pervasiveness of the structure of caste' but was curious as to whether over time, 'structural change' could emerge. How for instance might the Anti-Brahmin movement, or new urban middle classes phenomenon of India generate a structural and not solely positional change. The description of positional rather than structural change also reminded me of the orientalist, Hegelian idea of Hindustan being like a sponge, yielding but unchanging though Srinivas's vast encyclopaedic scholarship of dynamic caste relations works against this very image.

In *Historicising Modernity in Southeast Asia*, Barbara Watson Andaya of the University of Hawaii argues for the presence of a modern spirit in earlier times in Southeast Asia predating the Western concept of 'modern'. Barbara Watson

Andaya was born during world war two in Australia, received her BA from the University of Sydney and her MA at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii in 1966. The East-West Center was formed by the U.S. Congress in 1960 to ‘strengthen relations and understanding among the peoples and nations of Asia, the Pacific and the United States.’

In 2006, under a Guggenheim grant, she published *The Flaming Womb: Repositioning Women in Early Modern Southeast Asia*. Andaya, like Srinivas, notes the coming together of technological and mystical beliefs:

‘For Southeast Asian elites, already time-conscious in their preoccupation with determining astrologically appropriate moments for human activities, this new technology provided a means of fixing court rituals, noting a ruler’s death, recording the receipt of a letter or the completion of a building. When such timepieces fell into the hands of ordinary people, as in 1727 when the inhabitants of a remote Indonesian island took the hourglass from a Dutch shipwreck, they probably also contributed to the battery of methods used to control time. Significantly, however, the attraction of European chronometric technology was limited. In a region where astrological calculations were of enormous significance, and where the calculation of days, months and years were culturally and religiously weighted, the European calendar had little appeal except for the calculation of eclipses.

I was curious because I had read of how Suharto linked the Palapa satellite system, launched in 1976 to a mystical sense of the “unity and oneness of the Majapahit kingdom, whose breadth and width were much like those of our archipelago, Nusantara. Now the unity and oneness of Nusantara have been realized, but we have to fortify it. In order to fortify it, we will launch a satellite, which will be an important part of the Domestic Satellite System. With this system the communication from one place to another throughout Indonesia will be smooth and speedy. . . . A nation with easier connections among people, a nation that better understands national problems and that is better educated will be able to speed up development and strengthen its unity. This will mean greater national resilience. Thus, we give the name “Palapa” to the Domestic Communications Satellite System because it symbolizes the realization of Gajah Mada’s oath to unite Nusantara.” (Quoted from *Engineers and Political Dreams: Indonesia in the Satellite Age*, Joshua Barker 2005). I also read a New York Times [article](#), January 27, 2008, ‘As Suharto Clings to Life, Mystics See Spirits’ Power, reading of how in ‘SOLO, Indonesia: as former President Suharto hovers on the edge of death, some people here say it is not doctors and machines that have kept him alive, but an unseen cosmos of mystical forces... two weeks ago, when doctors said Mr. Suharto was dying, a huge tree fell near Parangtritis, the town that is home to the mystical Queen of the South Sea, where Mr. Suharto sometimes bathed in the ocean. The queen’s spectre is said to visit the sultans of Poso and of nearby Yogyakarta for periodic conjugal reunions.

The word spectre was interesting in that I also picked up the work of Benedict Anderson, *The Specter of Comparisons*. It made me curious in locating Barbara Andaya’s work in relation to Victor Lieberman’s *Strange Parallels*. At one point Andaya writes, ‘If we are willing to pursue Wolters’ suggestion that a desire to be “up-to- date” was deeply imbedded in Southeast Asian cultures, it is obvious that its nature must have been very different from that of Europe. In Southeast Asia knowledge of the outside was not due to an “age of discovery,” but to an intimate involvement with international

trade which stretched back over hundreds of years. The geographical position of these societies between China and India meant that they had long been part of an interactive world system which exposed them to a constantly changing parade of new ideas and objects.’ In *Volume 1* of *Strange Parallels*, Lieberman notes how Anthony Reid’s *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450–1680* (1988) captures Andaya’s sense of a newness borne continually on the oceanic currents:

‘In essence, the Age of Commerce thesis argued that from the early 15th century an expansion of Indian Ocean and Chinese demand encouraged throughout Southeast Asia a novel prosperity, together with a cultural cosmopolitanism and a trend toward centralized polities, all of which was reversed by the global economic downturn of the mid-17th century. Lieberman however argues that Reid gave scant attention to the Neo-Confucian revolution of the 15th century, presumably because its origins were independent of oceanic commerce and that by extension from the previous point, the impulses to integration across the mainland between c. 1450 and 1680 were generally more heterogeneous than Reid acknowledged and the relations between them, more fluid and indeterminate. In his emphasis on maritime trade, Reid in effect revived the “law of Southeast Asian inertia”: when maritime impulses suffused the region, it prospered, and when they ceased, Southeast Asia languished. Although barely mentioned, overland trade with China was a significant fraction of maritime trade. But more basic, amidst the tumult of the ports, we hear little or nothing about preeminently domestic sources of dynamism – about the elaboration of domestic (as opposed to maritime) commercial networks, rural demographic rhythms, rural educational networks, frontier reclamation, new crops and irrigation systems, agricultural taxation, changes in land tenure. Lieberman in effect traces the archipelago into the interior and finds historiographical blindspots in solely applying an oceanic logic to the transmission and transformation of ideas.

In *Volume 2* Lieberman carefully distinguishes between mainland trajectories and those in the archipelago as well as between variant patterns on the mainland, ‘rejecting East-West dichotomies to consider “sustained, if lethargic parallels” (vol. 1, p. 21). It would be curious fusing Lieberman’s strange parallels with Srinivas’s electrical field dynamics of Sanskritization; Westernization; and secularization in an exploration of coastal and interior India in its interactions with East Africa, Southeast Asia and a provincialized Europe. I was also curious as to whether Smith’s examination of supernatural beliefs in the Mao era generates a comparative equation of ritualization; sovietization and secularization, and a divergence in the 1970s toward a form of westernization modelled on the Japanese flying geese, Singaporean and Korean experiences, and of how Chinese area studies have opened up new frames and geographical directionalities (Eurasian, Pacific, Indic, Nanyang) by which to approach Lieberman’s thesis of strange parallels.

(1) M.N. Srinivas, “Sanskritization”, “Westernization”, “Secularization”, in *Social Change in Modern India*, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2005 [1966], pp. 1-48, 49-94, 125-154.

(2) 维克多·李伯曼:《形异神似: 全球背景下的东南亚(约800—1830年)》

(3) Barbara Watson Andaya, “‘Modernity’ in Southeast Asia,” *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient*, Vol. 40, No. 4 (1997), pp. 391-409.



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